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ATOMIC ENERGY-URANIUM PROCUREMENT-LEGAL AsPECTS OF 
THE AEC DOMESTIC ORE PURCHASE PROGRAM-The federal gov-
~rnment's domestic uranium ore procurement program, initially 
~nounced following World War II to ensure maximum explora-
tion and development for military purposes, has met with ex-
_traordinary success. So improved is this country's military ura-
nium picture that the Atomic Energy Commission was recently 
able to announce that uranium concentrate purchases would not 
be further increased.1 This announcement is viewed as a matter 
.of serious concern by the domestic ore producer, who must con-
tinue to look to the federal government as his sole market; a 
noticeable private market for peaceful uses of atomic energy fuels 
may not be realized for more than a decade.2 It becomes apparent 
1 Address -by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the Atomic Energy Commission raw 
materials division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, October 28, 1957. 
2 Estimates as to when a serious commercial market for peaceful uses of fissionable 
materials, for which uranium ore is now the principal source, vary considerably 
because of the intangibles involved in making such a prediction. A spokesman for the 
Uranium Institute of America, representing ore producers, recently commented that 
the uranium ore industry is about twelve years ahead of the commercial market; other 
· experts set the figure at closer to ten. A former AEC official remarked in December 1957 
that ,the total uranium requirement of all atomic power plants in the free world in the 
next ten years will amount to between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of uranium oxide. This 
figure compares with 40,000 ,tons of uranium oxide (30,000 in this country) expected 
to be produced annually by free world uranium mills before 1959. WALLS~ JOURNAL, 
December 18, 1957, p. 6:2. See also .testimony of Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-Presi-
dent, Uranium Institute of America, before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on 
Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 
-Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958). 
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that with the government market no longer unlimited, competi-
tion among producers and controversies with the AEC can be ex-
pected to grow more frequent and intense. Harbingers of such. 
developments are already on the scene. The first judicial de-. 
cision interpreting language in the government's guaranteed price. 
circulars-Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States3-was handed 
down a few months ago. It is anticipated that increasing competi-. 
tion and controversy will mean a correspondingly increased in-, 
spection and critical analysis of these price circulars, which at 
times are confusingly or improperly drafted. This comment is. 
designed to examine the legal and practical problems raised by 
these guarantees, with the anticipation that these problems may 
appear with considerably greater frequency in federal courts in 
the span of lean years before a substantial private market for 
uranium ore develops. 
I. The Program and the Industry 
Since Congress deliber~tely chose private enterprise as its 
medium for broad and rapid expansion of uranium ore explora-
tion and development, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (and sub-. 
sequently the 1954 act) contained an authorization for AEC ac-
quisition of uranium ore by purchase from private producers.4 
This purchase program, which formed the nucleus of the federal 
incentive system, was implemented by numerous fringe incentives 
designed to attract the energies of both small and large-scale 
prospecting and development units. At the exploration stage, for 
example, the Defense Minerals Exploration Administration was. 
formed to provide financial assistance to persons desiring to ex-; 
plore mining properties for unknown uranium. 5 Government 
technical data and facilities further encouraged exploration, 6 and 
federal construction of roads and provision for transportation· 
allowances permitted more economical development of discov-· 
3 (Ct. Cl. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403. 
4 Atomic •Energy Act of 1946, §5(b)5, 60 Stat. 762; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 
Stat. 933, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §2096. 
5 An extensive discussion of the operation of the D.M.E.A. is found in Tippit, 
"Federal Incentives to Uranium Mining," 27 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 457 at 458 (1957). Since, 
the writing of that article, the D.M.E.A. has reduced its percentage contribution to 
allowable costs of exploration. See DMEA Order No. 1, 32A C.F.R. (1956) C. XII, as 
amended 22 Fed. Reg. 8304 (1957). 
6 See generally Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, 
Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 26 (1955). . 
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ered deposits. 7 Initial production from mining properties was re-
warded with attractive bonuses,8 and in some locations "develop-
ment allowances" were paid for ore produced,° in addition to the 
guaranteed price, to encourage further development of mining 
properties. 
But there can be no doubt that the principal incentive for 
production was provided by the government's schedules of guaran-
teed minimum prices for uranium ores delivered to government 
depots. Pursuant to its statutory authority to acquire uranium 
.ore by purchase from private domestic producers, the AEC has 
issued a continuing series of regulations and releases providing 
an assured market for uranium ore.10 The original price schedules 
took effect in 1948, and while some of the guarantees have ex-
pired, government purchases are now guaranteed until 1966. 
Although certain problems arising with respect to these docu-
ments will be examined in some detail in the following sections 
of this comment, a brief description of their general provisions is 
perhaps desirable here. In 1948, the AEC issued two regulations 
offering guaranteed minimum prices for uranium-bearing ores 
and mechanical concentrates-Circular No. 3 for ores found in 
the Colorado Plateau, and Circular No. 1 for ores discovered else-
where.11 The latter regulation was applicable, however, only to 
ores containing ten percent or more uranium oxide. Since no 
7 Ibid. Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a(a)(3)(ii). 
s The Commission has for several years made a standing offer of a $10,000 bonus 
for discovery of and production from new high-grade domestic uranium deposits. The 
minimum grade for which the bonus will be paid is ore assaying 20% uranium oxide. 
Domestic Uranium Circular No. 2, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.2(a). While ,this appears to be a 
substantial incentive to initial production, it is not; no one has claimed the bonus. Hidden 
Splendor Mine, one of the richest ore deposits, checked only 0.4% uranium oxide. 
Mathis, "Uranium Boom Over,'' !LI.us. MAGAZINE OF WAU. STREET, Oct. 29, 1955, p. 139. 
A more realistic •bonus provision is •to be found in Domestic Uranium Program Circular 
No. 6, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.6. 
9 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3A, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3(b)(2)(ii); Domestic 
Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a(a)(3)(i). 
10 Those regulations and releases offering a guaranteed minimum price for uranium 
ore are Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.1; Domestic Uranium 
Circular No. 3, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3; Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5, 10 C.F.R. 
(Supp. 1958) §60.5. UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY CO!ll!IIISSION Rm.EAsE No. 830, May 24, 
1956, establishes for the period 1962-1966 a guaranteed minimum price for concentrate 
rather than ore. 
llDomestic Uranium Circular No. 3, IO C.F.R. (1949) §60.3, established a three-year 
guaranteed minimum price for roscoelite-type and carnotite-type ores of the Colorado 
Plateau. This guarantee expired in 1951. Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, 10 C.F.R. 
(_1949) §60.1, established a guaranteed minimum price for non-Plateau ores and runs 
until April 11, 1958. 
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ore of such high grade has yet been discovered,12 the only appli-
cable provision of this regulation in practice was a statement ex-
pressing the Commission's interest "in negotiating reasonable 
terms" with respect to lesser grade ores.13 It is significant to note 
that the minimum grade ore for which the government was will-
ing to offer a guaranteed price in the Colorado Plateau regula-
tion contained but one one-hundredth the percentage of uranium 
oxide as that for which guarantees were offered outside the Colo-
rado Plateau. 
Although there has been no AEC indication of the reason for 
this disparity, it is perhaps explained in terms of the uranium 
deposit situation at the time. Reserves outside the Plateau were 
generally unknown, and the Commission's immediate goal in set-
ting up a guaranteed price for the non-Plateau ores was no doubt 
to encourage maximum exploration, rather than production. 
Since it did not know the grade of ore which would be found and 
since it obviously preferred to negotiate individual contracts 
where possible, the Commission set a grade standard at a rela-
tively high level. The incentive for exploration was still present, 
since prospectors were equally ignorant of what they would find, 
and yet the standard was sufficiently high to assure the AEC that 
most of the production would be on the basis of individual con-
tracts. On the Plateau, however, reserves were already known to 
a much greater extent, and the Commission surmised that pro-
ducers would without doubt require a realistic price scheme as 
an incentive to maximum production. Thus the AEC set the mini-
mum acceptable grade level at a much lower point, thereby en-
couraging immediate production on the Plateau. 
In 1949 the guarantees for Colorado Plateau ores were ex-
tended by the AEC's Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5,14 and, 
as amended, this regulation guarantees prices until 1962. Cir-
cular No. 5 contains provisions substantially similar to the original 
regulation, except for slight changes in the price schedule. The 
guarantees for non-Colorado Plateau high grade ore, on the other 
hand, expire in 1958, and there has been no indication by the 
12,Mathis, "Uranium Boom Over," !LI.us. MAGAZINE OF WALL STREET, Oct. 29, 1955, 
p. 139. 
• 13 "However, the Commission will be interested in negotiating reasonable terms 
. with respect to deliveries of high-grade ores and refined products in lesser quantities 
and grades than those specified in .this section." Domestic Uranium Circular No. 1, IO 
C.F.R. (1949) §60.l(e). 
14 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5. 
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Commission of an intent to renew them. Production in these lat-
ter areas has been regulated by individual contracts with the gov-
ernment since no ore discovered has met the rigorous require-
ments of the guarantee in the original regulation.15 There is no 
reason to believe that such a practice will not be continued. 
Guarantees for the years following 1962 will take a different 
form. Instead of providing price schedules for uranium ore, the 
government will restrict its guarantees to uranium concentrate 
produced by the sixteen uranium mills16 which refine uranium 
ore into concentrate by mechanical or chemical processing.17 
This change in program represents a compromise by the Com-
mission between two very different objectives: (1) supporting the 
uranium producers, even though immediate government needs 
for uranium are being satisfied, as a precautionary military mea-
sure until private purchasers can provide a market for uranium; 
(2) preparing ore producers for the eventual replacement of the 
unrealistic guaranteed market with a private market by providing 
guarantees only indirectly, rather than directly as at present. 
These ends are further assured by the reservation that the AEC 
need accept only 500 tons of uranium oxide per year from "any 
one mining property or mining operation."18 Thus, not only will 
price guarantees be less stable, ·but the market for high grade ores 
will no longer be unlimited should the AEC choose to exercise 
its option not to buy. 
The practical effect of these changes will be examined briefly 
in section II-C below, and it is enough to remark here that pos-
lli Note 12 supra. 
16 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. A•45, March 7, 1958. 
17 See UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. 830, May 24, 1956. 
The decision to ease the transition to a commercial market through price guarantees on 
concentrates was made in preference to a recommendation of the McKinney Panel on 
the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, that tonnage guarantees should be 
given to producers instead of price guarantees. REPORT, PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF PEACEFUL 
UsES OF ATOMIC ENERGY Ganuary 1956), p. 143. The Commission rejected the McKinney 
Panel suggestion on the ground that the plan would not provide the individual producer 
with assurance that ihe would be able to market all or any part of his production. If 
such a program were adopted, it would require some kind of "allocation" system so that 
all producers would have an opportunity to sell at least part of their production. A.E.C. 
Comment ,to Recommendation 5, McKinney Panel. See Hearings of Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th 
Cong., 2d sess., p. 397, (1956). AEC ·feeling was strong t:hat in the future the primary 
commodity in the commercial market would be concentrate rather than ore, and it there-
fore ,would •be more realistic to put the former on a guaranteed basis than to continue sup-
porting the latter. See address by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the AEC raw materials 
division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. 
18 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. 830, May 24, 1956. 
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sible slow-downs will no doubt be an unsettling experience for 
the domestic producers of uranium ore. The boom fostered by 
the government program since 1948, while losing its public 
glamor two or three years ago, is only now beginning to fade for 
the major ore-producing companies. Indeed the industry fostered 
by this program is a considerable tribute to the incentive system. 
As compared with 1948, when the United States could boast 
practically no production of uranium ore and proven and poten-
tial reserves approximated two million tons, 19 recent AEC figures 
show annual ore delivery at the rate of 3.5 million tons, with 
ore reserves set at more than 78 million tons.20 Annual 
production is expected to increase to five million tons by 1959;21 
sixteen uranium mills (fifteen of them privately owned) are in 
operation; and more than 8,000 persons are employed in either 
domestic mining or milling operations.22 Adequate production 
and reserves for military purposes are realities. An industry which 
has prospered in response to federal incentives is now forced to 
bide its time, so to speak, until the predicted private market 
develops. 
II. Problems Raised by the Regulations 
A. Administrative Procedure 
While Circular No. 5 offers guaranteed prices for domes-
tically produced uranium ore, it has been pointed out that these 
guarantees today extend to only a small percentage of the ores 
actually extracted in this country-the roscoelite-type and carno-
tite-type ores of the Colorado Plateau.23 For the balance of the 
ore produced AEC policy has been to negotiate contracts pur-
suant to a note appended to Circular 5a24 upon terms often 
19 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, 
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 26 (1955). 
20 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. A-45, Marcil 7, 1958. 
21 Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, 
and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p 85 (1957). 
22 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. 1133, August 22, 1957; U.S. ATOMIC 
ENERGY COMMISSION RELEASE No. A-45, March 7, 1958. 
23 See discussion in section I supra. 
24At the end of Domestic Uranium Circular No. 5a, 10 C.F.R. (Supp. 1958) §60.5a, 
appears -this note: "The Commission will be interested in discussing arrangements for 
delivery to it of types of uranium-bearing materials other than those for which guaranteed 
prices have been established, such as tailings, mill products, and ores of types not accept-
able under §§60.5 and 60.5a." Presumably, the Commission is also basing its negotiated 
contract policy upon a similar note in Circular No. I. See note 13 supra. This latter 
provision expires in April 1958. 
792 MICHIGAN LA.w REVIEW [ Vol. 56 
reportedly less attractive than those of the Circular and in areas 
not covered by the Circular. It has been contended25 that this 
practice violates section 3(a) of the Federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act providing that "No person shall in any manner be re-
quired to resort to organization or procedure not . . . published" 
in the Federal Register.26 The contention is apparently based 
upon the theory that the note in the circular fails to give the re-
quired notice of the practice of negotiating contracts outside the 
Colorado Plateau on terms other than those published in the 
circular. 
It is submitted that the Commission's practice does not vio-
late section 3(a) of the act. That section was enacted to protect 
"the public from being required to pursue remedies which are 
not generally known."27 Although the circular in general applies 
only to the Colorado Plateau, the terms of the appended note 
do not purport to be limited to that area, and cover only materials 
for which guaranteed prices have not been established. Further, 
judicial construction of section 3(a) indicates that it was in-
tended as a protection against enforcement of unpublished pro-
cedural and organizational rules, as distinct from the voluntary 
contracts, arguably of a substantive nature, negotiated by the 
Commission pursuant to the note.28 
B. Contractual Provisions 
Circulars offering guaranteed minimum prices for unlimited 
amounts of property meeting certain specifications are necessarily 
25 A letter from Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of 
America, to the Michigan Law Review, January 21, 1958, states in part: "It ... has been 
the policy of the AEC to negotiate individual contracts for the purchase of uranium 
ore in locations not covered by Circular 5 and 5A .•.. You will note that at the end of 
Circular 5A a note is included indicating that the Commission will be interested in 
discussion of arrangements for the delivery of all types of uranium bearing materials 
other than those for which guaranteed prices have been established. On the basis of 
this notation, the Commission has contended that it ·has the authority to negotiate 
individual purchase contracts with uranium producers. . • . A contention that this 
procedure may not be in conformance with .the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 
3(a) is now being studied by the Uranium Institute." 
26 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1002(a). 
21 S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., 1st sess., p. 12 (1945). 
28 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Hotch v. United States, 
(9th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 280; United States v. Morelock, (D.C. Md. 1954) 124 F. Supp. 
932; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). Each of these cases involved the procedural 
validity of attempted enforcement of agency rules and remedies, unlike the voluntary 
and substantive nature of the contracts anticipated by the AEC circulars. See Newman, 
"Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations,'" 
63 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 930, n. 5 (1950). 
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curious documents in the contractual sense. The rather loose 
draftsmanship of the regulations in question adds little to their 
clarity, and one may be certain that considerable judicial intro-
spection will be necessary if these regulations continue to form 
the nucleus of the domestic procurement program. Specifically, 
matters of (1) offer and acceptance, (2) revocability, and (3) 
liquidated damages require clarification. 
I. Offer and Acceptance. While the provisions of Circular 
No. 1 expire this year, they are of extreme interest to the industry 
inasmuch as Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States construes them 
in such a way as to have a far-reaching impact upon ·persons re-
lying upon later circulars. Circular No. 1 provides that one "who 
has domestic refined uranium, high-grade uranium bearing ores, 
or mechanical concentrates of the quantity and grade specified 
in paragraph (e) ... may offer it for delivery to the Commis-
sion ... " whereupon the latter, upon receipt of this offer and an 
acceptable sample, "will forward to the person making the offer 
a form of contract ... ready for his acceptance." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)29 Although this language is not altogether internally con-
sistent, it strongly indicates government intention to make, by the 
"guaranteed price" circulars, a mere invitation to the industry to 
submit offers. In the Uranium Mines decision, the government 
attorney took this precise position, but the court held his interpre-
tation of the circular untenable: 
"The title of Circular No. 1 was 'Ten Year Guaranteed 
Minimum Price.' Its purpose was to induce persons to find 
and mine uranium. The Government had imposed such 
restrictions and prohibitions upon private transactions in 
uranium that no one could have prudently engaged in its 
production unless he was assured of a Government market. 
It could surely not be urged that one who had complied in 
every respect with the terms of the Circular could have been 
told by the Government that it would pay only half the 
'Guaranteed Minimum Price,' nor could he be told that the 
Government would not purchase his uranium at all.''30 
While the court's interpretation seems to contravene the ex-
pressed intent of the circular, its conclusion that the government 
cannot escape its obligation to buy from one who has produced 
in reliance on the circular seems reasonable and just. Once having 
29 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 1, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §§60.l(c) and (d). 
so Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. CI. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403 at 406. 
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determined this important question, however, the court does not 
go farther to define clearly the precise contractual setting which 
it found to have existed. If it is admitted that the government has 
made an offer, is it one of a unilateral contract, with delivery or ten-
der to be the act of acceptance, or one of a bilateral contract, look-
ing to a return promise to sell?31 Despite the fact that the specific 
language of the circular may be said at most to make an offer of 
a bilateral contract, it might be concluded that the Uranium 
Mines court would find a unilateral contract to have existed. The 
facts that the circular offered guaranteed prices "for the delivery 
to the Commission ... " (emphasis supplied),32 and that the gov-
ernment market was exclusive and its military demand poten-
tially unlimited for the ten-year period, point to the conclusion 
that the government probably would have looked to an act rather 
than a promise as the form of acceptance. It had little need of 
prior assurances of performance, with no other buyer in sight. 
Having stated exact requirements for acceptable ores or concen-
trates, the government appeared less interested in a return prom-
ise than in the act of delivery. If, on the other hand, the govern-
ment's circular represented an offer of a bilateral contract, the 
contract would be binding only in the event that a court reads 
in a return implied promise to deliver. While this is no doubt 
possible, the unilateral construction, it is submitted, may be 
termed more realistic in view of the economic conditions sur-
rounding promulgation of the Circular. 
Circular No. 3, as extended by Circular No. 5, contains lan-
guage sufficiently similar to Circular No. I to warrant the in-
ference that the same result would be reached in both instances. 
Significant in the former is the absence of detailed procedures 
81 The familiar difference between the unilateral and bilateral contract, both as to 
the requisite operative acts of the parties and the legal relations created by -those acts, 
is discussed in I CORBIN, CONTRACTS §21 et seq. (1950), where it is pointed out that certain 
unilateral contracts are not "bargains." It appears clear that in refusing to adhere to 
the government's "interpretation" of the circular, the Uranium Mines court was not 
"interpreting" the circular in ~he generally accepted sense of discovering the meaning 
of its language and terms, but was rather "construing" it, i.e., determining its legal 
effect. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §534 (1950). If an offer be understood as a statement 
or proposal -by one party of Jiis assent to certain definite terms whereby he creates in 
the other party the power ·by acceptance to bind the offeror, the court's apparent con-
struction of tlle circular as an offer seems reasonable. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball 
Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 484, affd. [1893] I Q. B. 256. 
82 Domestic Uranium Circular No. I, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.l(a). It is not unreasonable 
to conclude, the circular having been given the legal effect of an offer, that the Com-
mission, having specified carefully ,the required conditions of quantity and quality, 
looked ro -the act of delivery of acceptable ore as the mode of acceptance. 
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for offer and acceptance, indicating in general a stronger intention 
to constitute delivery as acceptance. While there is some language 
in Circular No. 3 pointing similarly to the formation of a bilateral 
contract,33 the policy factors motivating the Radium Mines de-
cision would undoubtedly dictate the unilateral construction were 
the government to refuse acceptance of qualified ore. 
2. Revocability of Offer. More perplexing, perhaps, than the 
determination of the nature of the offer involved, is the question 
of the revocability of the guaranteed price offers found in the 
circulars. While this question was not in precise issue in the 
Radium Mines decision, it is one which may conceivably become 
important if government oversupply becomes too great or the 
government should wish to reduce the price levels now 
offered. 
It is settled beyond doubt that an offer is ordinarily revocable 
by the offeror any time prior to acceptance, even when the offer 
is expressly declared to be "irrevocable."34 A continuing offer is 
enforceable as a "binding option" only when it is accompanied 
by an enforceable collateral promise not to revoke, or when the 
offer, left open for a specified period, becomes binding by virtue 
of a seal, consideration rendered in exchange, or subsequent 
action in reliance on it.35 It appears that if the government, there-
fore, attempted to revoke the guaranteed price schedule before 
a particular producer had accepted by tender or delivery, the 
sole basis upon which he could insist on enforcement of the offer, 
aside from doubtfully applicable doctrine of part performance 
in response to an offer of a unilateral contract, 36 would be the 
33 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.3, provides in §(d): "Sellers 
desiring to deliver in excess of 1,000 short tons (2,000 pounds per ton) of ores during 
any calendar year will be required to execute a contract with the Commission." But 
consideration of .the next sentence in the circular limiting the obligation of the Com-
mission to purchase to 5,000 short tons per calendar year, along with the other terms 
of the circular, indicates that §(d) was included rather as a device to insure better 
administration of the purchase program than as a manifestation of an intent not to be 
bound until completion of the contract. 
34 Night Commander Lighting Co. v. Brown, 213 Mich. 214, 181 N.W. 979 (1921); 
Grieve v. Mullaly, 211 Cal. 77, 293 P. 619 (1930). See generally Boston &: Maine Railroad 
v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. (57 Mass.) 224 (1849); Wight v. Linden, 69 Wyo. 67, 237 P. (2d) 475 
(1951). 
35 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §42 (1950). 
36 The seller's acts of exploration, mining, and collecting the ore would appear to 
constitute acts in preparation to render the requested act of performance, tender or 
delivery, and not strictly part performance. See Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 
N.W. 669 (1890); Curtis v. American C. &: R. Co., 38 App. D.C. 115 (1912). See also 1 
CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §45, comment a (1932). When, however, it is remembered that 
as pointed out in section I supra, part at least of the government's motivation in issuing 
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elusive concept of promissory estoppel.37 The Uranium Mines 
decision, while not deciding this question directly, contains lan-
guage indicating a willingness to support such an argument should 
the proper case arise.38 
If this is the proper interpretation of the court's language, 
then it would appear to contradict the reasoning of Judge Learned 
Hand in the leading case of James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros.39 
The court held that when an offer is made for a stipulated re-
turn "equivalent" from the offeree, either a requested return 
promise or act, promissory estoppel does not apply when the re-
liance action is other than the requested return promise or act. 
Judge Hand's opinion would therefore limit the applicability of 
promissory estoppel to situations such as in charitable subscrip-
tions in which the offeror requests no specific equivalent as a 
bargained-for exchange for his promise. Although Judge Hand 
applied his limitation in the context of an offer of a bilateral 
contract, the reasoning would appear equally applicable to an 
offer of a unilateral contract. It may be argued, however, that 
the limitation of the Baird case, while well-adapted to ordinary 
commercial transactions where an offer looks to a definite time 
the guaranteed prices was probably to induce exploration, the part performance argu-
ment is considerably strengthened, despite use of the unequivocal phrase "for delivery" 
actually employed in the circulars. Note also the argument in 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §51 
(1950), that when the offeree's acts in preparation to render the requested act are fore-
seeable to -the offeror, the offer should ·be iheld to be irrevocable. See Abbott v. Stephany 
Poultry Co., 5 Terry (44 Del.) 513, 62 A. (2d) 243 (1948). 
37 1 CONTRACTS R!i:sTATEMENT §90 (1932): "A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character 
on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding 
,if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 
as Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1957) 153 F. Supp. 403 at 406: "It 
could surely not be urged -that one who h_ad complied in every respect with the terms 
of the Circular could have been told by the government that it would pay only half 
the 'Guaranteed Minimum Price,' nor could he be told that the government would not 
purchase his uranium at all." If by compliance "in every respect" the court meant to 
include the act of delivery or tender of ore, the language quoted may not necessarily 
indicate a willingness to apply promissory estoppel. Counsel for plaintiff argued promis-
sory estoppel, but since the decision for the government was based on another ground, 
the court nowhere ruled squarely on the applicability of -the doctrine. Although finding 
in favor of plaintiff on the question of the nature of the government's offer, the court 
ultimately held for defendant on the ground that plaintiff's ore had not met the terms 
of the Circular. 
39 (2d Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 344. The limitation ~as been invoked in cases involving 
sub-contractor's bids and options for renewals of leases. See R. J. Daum Construction Co. 
v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P. (2d) 817 (1952); American Handkerchief Corp. v. Frannat 
Realty Co., 17 N.J. 12, 109 A. (2d) 793 (1954). But see Northwestern Engineering Co. v. 
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W. (2d) 879 (1943). Cf. Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 5 
Terry (44 Del.) 513, 62 A. (2d) 243 (1948). 
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and form of acceptance, should not be imposed in cases arising 
under these guaranteed price offers, since: (I) the duration of the 
offer is a specified number of years and is not controlled by the of-
feree' s acceptance; (2) timely acceptance by an offeree is not neces-
sary in view of the relative stability of the uranium market; (3) 
unlike the offer in the Baird case, these offers are made generally 
to a potentially unlimited number of sellers and the government 
is not concerned primarily with acceptance by a single offeree. 
3. Liquidated Damages. In contrast to the government indica-
tion in Circular No. I that it is willing to negotiate contracts for 
ores below the grade of those for which prices are guaranteed, 
Circular No. 3 states that any below-grade ores which are de-
livered to the purchase depot shall become the property of the 
buyer as liquidated damages for the buyer's expense of weighting, 
sampling, and assaying .... "40 The validity of this provision is 
open to serious question, although it must be admitted that it 
provides an effective means of insuring that ores delivered to 
the depot will have been tested for grade by the producer before-
hand. Nevertheless, the clause appears to violate two well estab-
lished rules concerning liquidated damages. 
The Restatement of Contracts, cited by numerous courts41 
with approval, states: 
"An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the dam-
ages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not 
affect the damages recoverable for the breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just 
compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is 
incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation."42 
In the clause in question, neither of the conditions necessary 
to validity, viz., a "reasonable forecast" and damages "very diffi-
cult of accurate estimation," is apparent. With respect to the first 
condition, a forfeiture of all the ore that a producer may mis-
takenly deliver to the depot cannot logically be termed a reason-
40 Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3a, 10 C.F.R. (1949) §60.3a(b)(2)(i). A similar 
provision appears in Circular 5a. 
41 E.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. Le Roy 
Dyal Co., (3d Cir. 1950) 186 F. (2d) 460, cert. den. 341 U.S. 926 (1951); Management, 
Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wash. (2d) 321, 235 P. (2d) 293 (1951). No decision has been 
found in which the facts involved forfeiture of non-conforming goods as liquidated 
damages for the prospective buyer's expense in handling the goods. 
42 1 CONTRACTS REsTATEMENT §339 (1932). 
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able forecast of the harm caused by the breach. While perhaps 
the expense of weighing the ore may bear a reasonable relation 
to the quantity of ore forfeited, no similar relationship exists to 
costs of assaying and sampling. Nor do these costs bear a relation 
to the quality of ore delivered; yet conceivably, ore containing 
0.09 percent uranium oxide is considerably more valuable than 
ore containing 0.01 percent. No attempt is made in the clause to 
reconcile these differences in actual economic effect in the individ-
ual case. 
Moreover, it does not appear, in accordance with the second 
Restatement condition, that damages are incapable or very diffi-
cult of accurate estimation. Man-hours lost in weighing,_ sampling, 
and assaying, plus any haulage costs involved in disposing of the 
unwanted ore, would appear to be highly accurate measures of 
the harm to the government and relatively easy to ascertain. The 
amount of damages, of course, must be based upon losses to the 
damaged party, so the suggested factors should be determinative 
in a given case.43 
In the broad sense, too, the clause involves clear inconsistency. 
On the one hand, the government rejects these ores as worthless 
to its program, thus rendering them in a closed market worthless 
for any purpose. On the other hand it accepts the ore as liqui-· 
dated damages, thereby imputing to the ore a value equivalent 
to the government's handling expenses. A court test of this pro-
43 There would appear to be little room for contention by the government that 
damages are uncertain ,because of the varying quality of ores forfeited. This factor looks 
to the uncertainty of the producer's loss because of forfeiture, and would not be a 
measure of the government's damages. To the contrary, the government has fixed its 
damages in terms of costs of weighing, sampling, and assaying. Since contract damages 
are intended only to compensate, no other basis appears justified. See 5 CORBIN, CoN• 
TRACTS §1002 (1950). If this is true, then the liquidated damages clause becomes un. 
warranted-actual damages being a matter of relative certainty. Courts frequently strike 
down liquidated damages provisions awarding an identical amount to the injured party 
in the event of any breach of the contract, no matter how important or insignificant. 
See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); Illinois Surety Co. v. United 
States, (2d Cir. 1916) 229 F. 527. The present provision presents the opposite side of the 
coin: for an injury which should not appreciably vary from case to case, property is forfeit-
ed which may range in value from nothing to a considerable amount, depending upon 
uranium oxide content. "Punishment of a promisor for breach, without regard to the 
extent of !harm -that he has caused, is an unjust and unnecessary remedy." CONTRACTS 
RE.sTATEMENT §339, comment a (1932). The sole argument that .the clause does not impose 
a punishment is that in fact the government may be doing -the producer a favor in dis-
posing of unwanted ores, ·by relieving the latter of the expense connected therewith. 
This contention appears tenuous in view (1) of -the phrasing of the clause as a com-
pensatory scheme and (2) the eventual chance that presently unwanted ores may become 
valuable with development of better refining processes and/or short supply of uranium. 
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v1s1on, it is submitted, will almost certainly result in finding the 
clause invalid. 
C. Practical Considerations 
As already indicated, 1962 will bring a shift in the emphasis of 
AEC guarantees. A minimum price will be offered by the Com-
mission for concentrate, rather than the ore itself, in the hope 
that the change will in part prepare the uranium mining industry 
for ultimate total elimination of an artificial market. A price of 
eight dollars per pound of contained uranium oxide has been 
tentatively set by the Commission.44 
The need for extension of at least a modified form of guaran-
tee was obvious. The much-heralded civilian market for uranium 
has been slow to develop and may only be said to lie ahead in 
the indefinite future.45 Keenly· aware of this situation and the 
fact that ore guarantees under Circular No. 5 would expire in 1962, 
ore producers geared production to a 1962 target date for exhaus-
tion of their reserves. With Circular No. 5 placing no limitation 
upon the amount of ore that buying stations would accept 
annually, producers were literally flooding the mills with more 
ore than the government wanted or could use. On the other hand, 
these same motivating factors portended a decline in the explora-
tion phase of the mining operation, the phase ultimately most 
important to the federal government.46 
To reverse the unbalancing effect of the approaching 1962 
44 U.S. ATOMIC EN.ERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. 830, May 24, 1956. There has been 
no regulation equivalent to the ore circulars which would put this guaranteed price 
officially into effect, despite the fact that more than eighteen months have passed since 
promulgation of the release. See remarks of Patrick J. Hurley, President, Uranium In-
stitute of America, before New Mexico Economic Development Council, December 9, 
1957. The resulting uncertainty in the price ultimately to be guaranteed could conceivably 
result in financing difficulties for the industry. For an example of the potential economic 
crisis caused by this delay, see the testimony of Governor Milward L. Simpson of Wyoming 
at Hearings •before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and 
State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA 
ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958). 
45 See note 3 supra. The AEC has traditionally been the source of the most optimistic 
estimates as to civilian nuclear power needs for uranium. Late in 1957, however, the 
chief of the Commission's commercial development branch stated that he did not believe 
that nuclear power would become economically competitive before the late 1960's. See 
WAIL STREET J., Dec. 18, 1957, p. 6:2. 
46 One of the arguments cited by the AEC in favor of concentrate guaranteed prices 
over the McKinney Panel recommendation, note 17 supra, of tonnage guarantees was 
the need for continuing assurance to those engaged in exploration and development 
that there would .be an adequate market. Address by Jesse C. Johnson, director of the 
AEC raw materials division, before the Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. 
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target date, the government extended its program, albeit shifting 
to indirect guarantees, and reserved the right to place a rela-
tively liberal ceiling upon the amount of uranium ore it would 
buy annually from "any one mining property or mining opera-
tion. "47 Its eight dollar price, while lower than prices now 
offered for concentrates, will by 1962 probably be only a slight 
depressant on production-prices offered for concentrates having 
decreased steadily with the discovery of more efficient milling 
processes.48 The comparative silence of the industry with respect 
to the price is a rather good indication that producers are not 
unduly concerned. 
A regulation placing the new price guarantees into official 
form has not been promulgated.49 The AEC release in which the 
concentrate price program was announced, however, states that 
concentrate producers who desire to sell "will be required to enter 
into contracts specifying the period of delivery, the quantity to 
be delivered, the rate of delivery, the place of delivery, the type 
of packaging and other standard provisions of commercial type 
contracts."50 Even more clearly than in Circulars No. 1 and 5, 
the government here ·appears to be looking to negotiated bilateral 
contracts. If the circular which is published to make the new 
program official contains similar language, it will be difficult 
47Note 18 supra. In practice, this provision will mean that if the Commission desires, 
it may limit a single mine or operation to production of about 200,000 tons of average 
grade Plateau ore per year. Address of Philip Merritt, Senior Geologist, Longyear Com-
pany, before Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. See also Knabel, "Uranium Min-
ing," ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL F0Ru111 IV, p. 26 (1956). AEC figures for fiscal year 1957 indicate, 
however, that only six shippers out of a total of 727 produced :more ,than 100,000 tons 
of ore for the year. Address of Elton A. Youngberg, Assistant Manager for Operations, 
Grand Junction Operations Office, United States Atomic Energy Commission, ·before a 
symposium on the future of uranium at Denver, Colorado, December 16, 1957. Thus 
while there has been no definition as yet of the phrase "any one mining property or 
mining operation," any semantically justifiable definition will not appear -to work undue 
hardship. 
48 The average price paid for domestically produced concentrate in fiscal year 1956 
was $11.60 per pound for uranium oxide; in 1957, it -was $10.50. The estimate for the 
current fiscal year is $9.60 and .for 1959, $9.30. WALL STREET J., December 17, 1957, p. 
8:2. Commenting upon the extended program, Jesse C. Johnson of the AEC has stated: 
"As I have indicated, the guaranteed $8. price was based on a study of conditions today. 
We have no crystal 1ball to tell what economic conditions will be in 1962 or 1966 •••• If 
the price is too low, it can be raised, or special premiums established for marginal 
production." Address .before Atomic Industrial Forum, June 25, 1956. See also remarks 
of Gordon A. Weller, Executive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of America, at Hearings 
before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the 
Atomic Energy Industry, 85th Cong., 1st sess., p. 281 (1957). 
49 See note 44 supra. 
50 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION RELEAsE No. 830, May 24, 1956. 
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for future courts to ignore, as did the Uranium Mines decision, 
the specific import of the language. Yet those same considerations 
which motivated the unorthodox construction by the Uranium 
Mines court will be generally present.51 The question may well 
become crucial in the coming decade if the government market 
is not further extended, and a substantial commercial market has 
not developed. 
This potential hiatus between the termination of government 
guarantees and development of private demand, the recent slow-
down in expansion of AEC purchases, and the ever-present threat 
that the fusion process52 may make uranium an obsolete fuel, all 
point toward a disquieting future for the uranium industry. 
While it is certain that the government has no intention-as a 
matter of military preparedness-to permit the industry to die 
altogether, there is also little reason for the government to main-
tain production at the present high level. Ideally, the AEC would 
no doubt like the producers to continue extensive explorations 
so that we may more accurately know our reserves. It need only 
support the companies to the extent that this limited end is 
assured. 
Ill. Conclusion 
The tranquility which has attended the government's domes-
tic uranium procurement program since its inception may be 
traced directly to the phenomenon of a buyer willing to accept 
a greater volume of goods than sellers can produce. This market 
situation is now changing, and as government demand becomes 
more limited, so also the producers' unquestioning attitude to-
ward arbitrary or confusing provisions of the government guaran-
51 Still present will be .the factors of a controlled, single-purchaser market (until 
a private market develops), producer reliance upon the guarantees as the basis for 
operations, and ostensible government willingness to buy up to the amount specified 
from any one mining property. There is no specification, :however, of delivery of the 
ore as the apparent mode of acceptance in .the release, as there has been in the circulars. 
In view of the non-official nature of the AEC release, an interesting question arises as 
to the right of the government to set, in its official regulation, a price lower than the 
eight dollar figure of the release. Perhaps a court might answer the question by asking 
itself to what extent the industry, in its present production, relies upon the specific 
announced price as compared to a lower one. Reliance may be based, however, upon 
the mere fact of extension of guarantees and not the specific price set. 
52 This factor, together with the possibility that breeder-type reactors will eventually 
diminish the demand for new uranium ore, was pointed out by Dr. Willard F. Libby, 
member of the AEC, in an address before the National Western Mining Conference, 
February 8, 1957. 
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tees will disappear.53 Those producers fortunate enough to sur-
vive the lean years of transition to a civilian market will undoubt-
edly do so in part by demanding clarifications of their contractual 
relations with the government and gearing their operations ac-
cordingly.* 
Michael Scott, S.Ed. 
Edward M. Heppenstall 
53 For an indication of the producers' present dissatisfaction with the AEC program 
and the future that it offers the industry, see the testimony of Gordon A. Weller, Ex-
ecutive Vice-President, Uranium Institute of America, at Hearings before Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, 
85th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 24, 1958, reported in BNA ATOMIC INDUSTRY REP. 4:70 (1958). 
• After this comment was in page proof, the AEC announced that it had taken 
action which would "expand to a limited extent domestic uranium procurement." This 
decision reversed the earlier Commission policy, announced in October 1957, to limit 
further expansion of domestic concentrate production. The Commission now estimates 
that, as a result of the added planned procurement, annual concentrate production would . 
be expanded by about 2500 tons of uranium oxide. See U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 
R.ELEAsE No. A-71, April 2, 1958. Primary motivation .for the government action was a 
detailed report completed by the A.E.C. division of raw materials on March 31, 1958, 
describing the domestic mining and milling problems growing out of the earlier 
policy.-M.S. 
